Пер А.Рудлинг: Українські ультраправі і "нав"язування Пам"яті" 1991–2021

1 Jakub Bornio, “The Polish-Ukrainian Dispute over the Volhynian Massacres: Investigating the Logic behind the Polish Narrative,” Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, vol. 9, issue 2 (April 2024): 63–101; Delphine Bechtel, “Von Lemberg nach L’viv: Gedächtniskonflikte in einer Stadt an der Grenze,” Osteuropa, vol. 58, no. 6 (2008): 211–227.

2 The adherents of Dontsovian ideology referred to themselves as Nationalists – with a capital N. To denote a distinction between generic nationalism and the Dontsovian tradition of the OUN, this article refers to the radicals as “Nationalists” with an upper case N.

3 Upon initiation, members swear not to reveal anything about the organization. They are forbidden even to reveal if they are members (Luciuk 1984, 318–319, 253). They also pledge to treat “enemies of Your Nation with hatred and ruthlessness”(Boshyk 1986, 173).

4 In 1943, Horak volunteered to serve in the 14th Waffen-SS Division Galizien, where he advanced to the rank of SS-Untersturmführer, or Second Lieutenant; after the war, in 1949–1952, he was trained by US intelligence at a political action school in Bavaria, while simultaneously carrying our duties for the OUN(b). “HORAK Stefan,” August 25, 1955, FOIA ESDN (Crest): 519b7f9a993294098d513463, Stefan Horak Name File, National Archives Record Administration [hereafter NARA], College Park, MD. Record Group [RG] 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, entry ZZ-18, box 57, RC Location 230/86/23/01, Also available online in the CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection HORAK, STEFAN_0003.pdf, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HORAK%2C%20STEFAN_0003.pdf. (Accessed September 22, 2023.)

5 In his 2012 short biographic sketch on Stefan Horak, Leonid Rudnytzky writes that “having immigrated to Germany during WWII, [Horak] studied at the University of Erlangen, where he obtained a doctorate in history in 1949, and later he supplemented his studies at the Universities of Bonn (1952) and Tübingen (1953–56).” “Horak emigrated to the USA rather late – 1957. The bulk of the so-called Third Wave of Ukrainian Emigration came to this country in the late 1940s and early 1950s” (Rudnytzky 2012, 829). Horak’s CIA personal dossier provides a quite different story. It lists Horak’s training at a CIA Political Action School in Munich and provides the context as to why he, as a former Waffen-SS officer, had his 1949 immigration application rejected. [redacted]“MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF; EASTERN EUROPEAN DIVISION, SUBJECT: Threatening Letters Received from Former Employee,” October 9, 1952 “HORAK, STEFAN,” FOIA ESDN (Crest): 519b7f9a993294098d513463, Stefan Horak Name File, NARA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, box 57, RC Location 230/86/23/01. Also available online in the CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Special Collection Special Collection, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/HORAK%2C%20STEFAN_0001.pdf. (Accessed September 22, 2023.)

6 In October 2023, the Dmytro Shtohryn International Ukrainian Studies Conference was held in honor of the leading OUN(b) activist and scholar, founder of the Ukrainian Studies program at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Dmytro Shtohryn (1923–2019) was a key OUN(b) and ABN activist in the US, who built up the SUM in the US zone of occupied Germany (Romaniv 2019; Sobol and Lenkart 2019).

7 The first articles dedicated to the Holocaust in Ukraine in Nationalities Papers appeared in 2002 and 2006, focusing on Romanian anti-Jewish murder in Transnistria and Bukovyna (Solonari 2002; Solonari 2006).

8 The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and the University of Alberta administers at least a dozen endowments in the honor of Waffen-SS volunteers, to a value in excess of 1.4 million dollars (CIUS n.d.).

9 For instance, there is no study of this, the largest and most radical far right Ukrainian group in emigration. Existing studies only marginally touch upon the period after 1956. See, for instance, Antons 2014; Armstrong 1955; Burds 2001; Holian 2011; Shkandrij 2015. The exception here is Rossoliński-Liebe 2014, 317–362 and 407–457.

10 On the LUC’s 10,000,000 claim, see Romanyshyn, Gregorovich, and Steciw 2008. The inflated claim of 10,000,000 Ukrainian famine deaths in the Ukrainian SSR in 1932–1933 was propagated by Presidents Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, and Viktor Yushchenko alike (Hadzyns’ka 2021). The most authoritative studies by historical demographers estimate the deaths in the Ukrainian SSR during the 1932–1933 famine to be between 2.6 and 3.9 million (Vallin et al. 2002).

11 In 2015, there were 46 monuments and over 100 streets renamed in honor of Bandera (Kuzio 2015a, 180).

12 The salutation was introduced by the OUN(b) in April 1941 and was to be carried out with a raised right arm, “slightly to the right, slightly above the peak of the head” while calling “Glory to Ukraine” (Slava Ukraini!) and responding ‘Glory to the Heroes! (Heroiam Slava!)’ a little above and to the right of the forehead.” The accompanying raised arm salutation was quietly abandoned in 1943 (Rossoliński-Liebe 2011, 89).

13 Born Hanna-Evheniia Muzyka, she adopted not only her husband’s surname but the female form of his first name as well, though shortening it from Yaroslava to Slava, “to avoid misunderstanding” (Kyiv Post 2003).

14 This mirrors Soviet traditions, with meetings with veterans and school extra-curricular activities with military-patriotic themes (Kuebart 1989, 104–107).

15 A landmark in the historiography of the Volhynian massacres was the publication of Ewa and Władysław Siemaszkos’ two-volume work in 2000.

16 LUC activists Borys Potapenko (b. 1951) and Orest Steciw were integral to arranging these events, with funding from the Semen and Olha Bida Fund of the Buduchnist Credit Union Foundation, under the auspices of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) (Potapenko 2012; Steciw 2012). Buduchnist’s pockets are reported to be rather deep – in 2012 alone, according to Shepetyk, per its 2013 report, its assets grew with 59 million dollars, reaching a total of 551 million Canadian dollars, and its donations to community organizations reached 1.7 million (Shepetyk 2013, 7).

17 When inquired about this fellowship, HURI informed the author that “The wording was not strictly accurate…. Mr. Viatrovych was simply delivering a lecture on the Lebed archive, as a summary report on his research at Harvard… Specific details concerning the funding and purpose of his time as a visiting scholar falls within the scope of matters of privacy and this can only be answered by Mr. Viatrovych himself” (Tymish J. Holowinsky to author, May 17, 2016).

18 Patryliak (b. 1976) has a background in the far-right Splika nezalezhnoi ukrains’koi molodi (SNUM). See, for instance, Patryliak 2001.

19 Following the full assault of the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022, the approval of the genocidal narration of the famine has soared. According to a November 2022 survey by the Sociological group “Rating,” 93% agreed “with the thesis that the Holodomor of 1932–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people,” an increase of 8 percentage points since the previous year. Similar numbers believe that Ukraine was the midst of a genocide in the present. In total, 89% of the respondents “support the recognition of the actions of Russian troops in Ukraine as the genocide of the Ukrainian people” (Reitinh 2022b). One factor that impacts the change of attitude is also the illegal Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory since 2014. Since support for the post-2005 official memory politics was low in the occupied territories, the absence of these voices in the opinion polls likely makes the shift appear more abrupt (Kulyk 2023).

20 In 2022, following the full-scale Russian assault, approval for the OUN(b) and UPA has soared further. Then, 81% of Ukrainians had a positive view of OUN-UPA, a four-fold increase since 2010, and a doubling since 2015. There is a similar increase in the approval of the legacy of Stepan Bandera, which grew from 22% in 2012 to 74% in 2022 (Reitinh 2022a).

21 Tracing money transfers in one of the most corrupt countries in Europe is notoriously difficult. Inquires, to V”iatrovych and Yasynevych about the source of funding have gone unanswered or yielded no result. Through published sources can be ascertained that alone the English and Polish translations of V”iatrovych’s book Druha pol’s’ka-ukrains’ka viina amounted to CAD 50,000 (Svyntukh-Zaverukha and Yatsyla 2013; Shevchenko Foundation 2015, 32). Funding came from the Shevchenko Foundation/Ukrainian Canadian Veterans Fund and the Prometheus Foundation through the “Volhynia – 1943 Committee” in Toronto, Canada (‘’V”iatrovych, 2020: iv). In 2023, with funding from, among others, the Ucrainica Research Institute, the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Foundation and the Ukrainian Canadian Veterans’ Fund, with “useful advice and assistance” from Dr Oleh Romanyshyn and Orest Steciw, a substantially revised English version of V”iatrovych’s 2011 collection of carefully selected documents on the UPA appeared, co-edited by Lubomyr Luciuk (V”iatrovych 2011; V”iatrovych and Luciuk 2023: xvii). A scandal followed as the book was listed on a list of “Best Historical Materials List 2023” by the American Library Association, only to be removed from the list with an apology issued following the publishing of a highly critical exposé of the book in The Nation (Golinkin 2024). V”iatrovych’s LUC sponsors currently plan to publish his book in French and German (V”iatrovych 2021, quote at 0:56–1:05).

22 Genocide claims, central to the identity of Lithuanian émigrés, came to form a corner stone of the state ideology of the modern Lithuanian state. Governmental agencies such as the Genocide and Resistance Center and the Museum of Genocide Victims carefully manage and maintain the trauma, often in combination with veneration of political activists whose actions during the Holocaust were highly problematic (Budrytė 2004; Subotić 2019, 150–204; Weiss-Wendt 2018).